ABSTRACT: It is widely believed that the United States has eclipsed Europe in pharmaceutical research productivity. Some leading analysts claim that although fewer drugs have been discovered worldwide over the past decade, most are therapeutically important. Yet a comprehensive data set of all new chemical entities approved between 1982 and 2003 shows that the United States never overtook Europe in research productivity, and that Europe in fact is pulling ahead of U.S. productivity. Other large studies show that most new drugs add few if any clinical benefits over previously discovered drugs. I discuss ways in which Congress, employers, and insurers can increase the value of drugs and revitalize the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. [Health Affairs 28, no. 5 (2009): w969-w977 (published online
F
o r m o r e t h an a d e c a d e , industry and official reports have concluded that the United States has overtaken Europe in the discovery of new drugs, commonly defined as new chemical entities (NCEs) . "Europe risks to be relegated into the fringe of the industry," concluded a seminal report that has shaped European policy. 1 "The United States has become the dominant player," the European trade association reported in 2008, as U.S. research investments grew 5.2 times from 1990 to 2007 compared to 3.3 times in Europe. 2 Reinforcing this view, Henry Grabowski and Richard Wang examined all new chemical entities discovered between 1982-1992 and 1993-2003 and concluded that U.S. firms had overtaken their European counterparts. 3 They also concluded that although the number of new chemical entities declined, their quality is high and has increased. In other words, most new drugs that are discovered are better than existing drugs, and most come from the United States.
This paper offers a new perspective based on a reanalysis of Grabowski and Wang's key findings and large studies of clinical quality over many years. It thus poses important challenges to widely held American beliefs about U.S. dominance in pharmaceutical research productivity and about the superior quality of those
new drugs. The findings suggest that Congress and large purchasers are motivating companies to develop and market drugs that add little value, instead of rewarding true added value. This is not good for the long-term vitality of the industry or for those paying too much for too little.
Research Productivity: The Basic Picture
Let us start with the findings of Grabowski and Wang based on their comprehensive data set from IMS Health of all 919 new chemical entities approved between 1982 and 2003. 4 They used various criteria to identify which were "global" (introduced into four or more of the Group of 7, or G7, countries), first-in-class, biotech, and orphan (those developed to treat rare, or orphan, diseases) NCEs. New chemical entities were assigned to the country in which the headquarters of the company that first launched them was located. This resulted in an exhibit showing how many of each type were discovered in Europe, the United States, or Japan for 1982-1992 and 1993-2003 . The present reanalysis accepts their data and definitions in order to examine the percentages and ratios of innovation. 5 If one simply calculates the percentage of NCEs credited to the United States, Europe, and Japan, one sees in Exhibit 1 that the U.S. share of all NCEs rose dramatically from the first period to the second, while the European and Japanese shares declined. The United States gained in global, first-in-class, biotech, and orphan NCEs as well. 6 One can see, however, that European research productivity scarcely declined, and Europe continued to dominate in discovering all NCEs as well as the highly profitable global NCEs.
Clearly, the United States did not overtake Europe in discovering new chemical entities, and European researchers lost less ground than either Europeans or Americans believe. 7 Despite the appeal of launching first in the big, highly profit-P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s w 9 7 0 2 5 A u g u s t 2 0 0 9 able U.S. market, where companies face the fewest delays to market and can charge the highest prices, overall NCE research productivity in Europe using Grabowski and Wang's criteria and data was greater, even in the later period.
Research Productivity On A Level Playing Field
Research productivity and total funding are often confounded, as in the typical claim that "the U.S. has established itself firmly as the key innovator in pharmaceuticals since 2000." 8 To what degree is this a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting from the industry's pouring more money into American research and development (R&D), and to what degree are American labs and teams becoming more innovative, dollar for dollar?
A simple but important measure of research productivity would compare the proportion of industry R&D funding for the United States, Europe, and Japan to the proportion of new chemical entities in each. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations has culled investment figures for 1990 and 2000 reported by member companies to the U.S., Japanese, and European trade associations and corrected for exchange rates. 9 Because no annual figures are given, these can approximate funding distributions for the first and second decades analyzed by Grabowski and Wang; thus, they can be used to roughly calculate the relationship between research productivity and funding. 10 As shown in Exhibit 2, pharmaceutical companies increased their R&D investments in the United States from about a third of the three-country total in 1990 to half in 2000. R&D investment in Europe dropped twelve percentage points during the decade, and investment in Japan declined around two percentage points. Absolute numbers increased everywhere because companies reported a rapid increase in total R&D investments, from 15.9 billion euro (US$22. Overall research productivity can be measured by the proportion of new chemical entities to the proportion of R&D investment in the three countries. For example, if U.S. research teams received 33 percent of the budget, they should discover about 33 percent of all NCEs-a ratio of 1.0. By dividing the percentage of all NCEs in Exhibit 1 by the percentage invested, one can see that the United States discovered far fewer NCEs than its proportional share of funding: 0.76 (25.3/33.3) in the first period and 0.75 in the second. Europe's ratio of all NCEs to investment went from 0.99 in the first period to 1.17 (43.3/36.9) in the second. Japan's proportionate ratio was the highest: 1.49 in the first period and 1.36 in the second.
The big news in terms of innovation and international policy is the low and flat U.S. productivity and the high Japanese productivity. Of course, these ratios are constantly changing, and there is a lagged effect; however, Grabowski and Wang's conclusions about U.S. dominance are not supported by their own data.
How did the United States, Europe, and Japan perform for global and first-inclass new chemical entities? In global NCEs, European research productivity was about the same as U.S. productivity in the first period but increased by 30 percent in the second period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , while U.S. research productivity declined 26 percent (Exhibit 3). In first-in-class drugs, European relative innovativeness moved from well behind the United States in the first period to well ahead in the second. These are the most commercially and therapeutically important types of new chemical entities.
In biotech products, European researchers became much more innovative in the To summarize, this reanalysis provides strong, general evidence that U.S. firms have not overtaken their European counterparts in pharmaceutical innovation. European research productivity has actually increased in proportion to funds received and would prove stronger still if new first-in-class and orphan drugs 
No Good Evidence Of Better Quality
The claim that most new drugs are of high quality or "important" for patients is puzzling, because Grabowski and Wang never really define what they mean by "quality," and my extensive correspondence with Grabowski produced no clear answer. From the perspective of patients, physicians, and health plans, "quality" means that new drugs are clinically more effective or have fewer side effects than existing treatments; however, Grabowski and Wang did not use data or studies of therapeutic outcomes. Instead, for example, they claim that global NCEs launched in four or more G7 industrialized countries are an "indicator of a drug's commercial and therapeutic importance." This confounds two quite different attributes.
Nexium and Lipitor, for example, are among the world's top-selling drugs, but Nexium is widely regarded as a textbook case of a me-too drug, and Lipitor has little proven clinical advantage over other statins. 13 Most new cancer drugs generate large revenues at high prices but have not proved to be clinically superior to existing ones.
14 Only 7 percent of new biotech products were proven clinically superior to comparator drugs in randomized trials. 15 In short, commercial success is often distinct from therapeutic importance.
The best evidence of clinical quality comes from systematic efforts to assess therapeutic advantage and adverse effects compared with existing drugs. A detailed analysis of therapeutic quality in new drugs over the past twenty years found that 14 percent of all new chemical entities are either therapeutic breakthroughs or substantially superior to existing medications. 16 17 During an earlier period, an often-cited industry assessment of all global NCEs in the 1970s and 1980s found that only about 11 percent of all new "international" drugs brought substantial new benefits to patients-a ratio of one in nine. 18 These figures are lower than the proportion of drug candidates given a priority rating by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), because this rating is based on several criteria of promising benefits that might not always materialize.
Thus, different organizations, using somewhat different criteria and procedures, have found that during the past forty years about 11-15 percent of new chemical entities have been therapeutically "important," as Grabowski and Wang P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s w 9 7 4 put it, and 85-89 percent have not been-a contrast with their using nontherapeutic criteria to conclude that 88.8 percent of all new chemical entities have been therapeutically important.
Policy Reflections
This study shows how data purporting to document how "U.S. firms overtook their European counterparts in innovative performance" actually document the greater and increasing research productivity of Europe. On the European side, a series of reports commissioned by the European Commission's DirectorateGeneral for Commerce between 1993 and 2003 pronounced that the United States had eclipsed Europe in research productivity, despite little solid evidence. 19 Congressional leaders and others concerned about high prices of new patented drugs will be heartened by this analysis, because lower European prices seem to be no deterrent to strong research productivity. 20 A previous analysis using industry-based data showed that pharmaceutical companies recover all costs and make a good profit at European prices. 21 Europeans are not "free riders" on American patients-another myth promoted by industry that assumes that countries are separate R&D/market silos that should each pay for themselves.
The real innovation crisis for patients and society is not the recent decline in new molecular entities but the small percentage over many years of new molecular entities that provide clinical advantages to patients over existing medications. This longer pattern stems from defining "effective" as better than placebo and using soft surrogate endpoints, or substitute criteria, instead of hard clinical endpoints. 22 As a result, the vast majority of new drugs that constitute 80 percent of U.S. pharmaceutical costs offer few therapeutic advantages and greater risks than good drugs discovered in prior years. 23 High prices for these new drugs enable companies to spend two and a half times more on marketing than on R&D, to persuade physicians to prescribe them and patients to want them. 24 Thus, current incentives reward better marketing more than better value.
If we want new drugs to be clinically superior to existing ones, we need to reward companies for developing them and not for developing drugs that are merely superior to placebo. Arjun Jayadev and Joseph Stiglitz propose a key strategy: pay in terms of clinical value added, as some large purchasers already do and as Consumer Reports Best Buy Drugs does by comparing value with price. 25 Jayadev and Stiglitz also recommend having clinical trials independently run and paid for by a public body such as the National Institutes of Health so that they can be designed to measure comparative advantages and risks over existing treatments. Publicly funded trials would also reduce cost and risk for pharmaceutical companies and
